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Punitive

Damages

after

BMW

v.

Gore

(1996)

FredW. MorganandKarlA. Boedecker
The U.S. SupremeCourt handeddown its decision in BMWv. Gore (1996) in May. This
decision triggeredanother roundof discussions regarding restraintson punitive damages
as a part of the overall reformof the U.S. tort system. Here, the authors review the BMW
decision and its immediatepredecessors to illustrate the essential public policy issues that
are associated with proposed limits on punitive damages.

Punitive

damagesgenerallyare levied againstdefen-

dants who recklessly or flagrantly violate victims'
rights. Punitive damages originatedto punish perpetratorsof intentionaltortsand thereforehave a hybridorientation that falls between civil cases involving only compensatory damagesand criminalcases (McKown 1995, p. 423).
Product liability commentatorshave disagreed about the
applicability of punitive damages because of this quasicriminal flavor. In addition,because strict liability1is often
the basis for a product liability claim, experts have suggested that punitive damages are difficult to determine, if
not altogetherinappropriate(ALR 4th 1996).
Over the past decade the U.S. Supreme Court has
reviewed several cases involving contested punitive damages awards(Browning-FerrisIndustriesv. Kelco Disposal
1989; Honda Motor v. Oberg 1994; Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance v. Haslip 1991; TXO Products v. Alliance
Resources 1993). The Courthas declined to set specific limits on punitive damages, either an absolute amountor relative to compensatoryawards.Commentatorshave reviewed
these decisions, often disagreeing strongly with the reasoning and implicationsof the Court's rulings (see, e.g., Cutter
1995; Dragutsky 1994; Schwartz and Behrens 1993). In
May 1996, in BMWof North America v. Gore (1996), the
Courthad anotheropportunityto develop clear standardsto
guide the applicationof punitive damages. Once again, the
Courtchose to leave these decisions at the state level.
Our purpose is to examine primarypublic policy issues
surrounding the appropriateness of punitive damages
awards.We first provide a historicalperspectiveon the role
of punitive damages. We then offer an assessment of the
scope of punitive damages in U.S. product liability litigation. We next review recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions
that have dealt with policy issues surroundingpunitivedamages. We then analyze these issues in detail, addingour own
IStrictliabilityis a publicpolicyliabilitytheory,whichis basedon insuranceconceptsof risk-spreading
andplacingthe burdenof liabilityon the
sellerwhois betterableto bearandspreadthecostsof consumers'injuries.
Strictliabilitydoesnotrequirenegligentbehaviorby thedefendant;
hence,
behaviorallybased punitive damagesawardscould be conceptually
inappropriate.
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views of how punitivedamages shouldbe handledby courts
and legislatures.

History and Role of PunitiveDamages
We now look at the origins of punitive damages and trace
their evolution to the present.

Evolutionof PunitiveDamages
EarlyOrigins
The doctrine of punitive damages has deep roots in AngloAmericanlaw, and its origins can be tracedto Mosaic law,
which specifies paymentby wrongdoersbeyond the amount
necessary to compensate their victims for direct losses.
Therefore, when someone wrongfully took the animal of
anotherand convertedit to his own use, the rule was clear
(The JerusalemBible 1971, Exodus 21:37): "If a man steals
an ox or a sheep and then slaughtersor sells it, he must pay
five oxen for the ox, four sheep for the sheep."
Similarly, a paymentto the wronged person would serve
as both compensationand punishmentin situationsin which
difficulty might occur in fixing actual damages for a civil
violation (The JerusalemBible 1971, Exodus 22:15):
If a manseducesa virginwho is notbetrothed
andsleepswith
her,he mustpay herprice[mohar,the "brideprice"paidby a
betrothed
manto thefamilyof his futurewife]andmakeherhis
wife. If her fatherabsolutelyrefusesto let him have her,the
seducermustpaya sumof moneyequalto thepricefixedfora
virgin.
The ancient Greeks recognized the use of payment by
wrongdoers to victims, in addition to other legal admonitions (Walther and Plein 1965, p. 377, citing Plato, The
Laws IX, p. 106):
Whenany one commitsany injustice,smallor great,the law
will admonishandcompelhimeitherneverat all to do the like
again,or nevervoluntarily,or at anyratein a far less degree;
andhe mustin additionpayfor thehurt.

English Origins
Statutoryprovisions for punitive damages, in the form of
double or treble damages in civil suits in which a tenant
allows avoidable harmto real property,can be tracedas far
back as The Statuteof Gloucester (1278, p. c5) in medieval
England. A series of eighteenth century common law decisions establishedthe principle thatjuries could assess dam-
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ages in excess of actuallosses when it was necessaryto punish the defendantand deter such conduct in the future.In a
widely cited case, Wilkesv. Wood (1763), the court upheld
an exemplarydamageawardin which little actualharmhad
occurred.Lord Halifax, Secretaryof State to King George
II, issued an improperwarrantto suppress publication of
The North Briton. British officials searched the house of
John Wilkes, the publisher, who then sued for "large and
exemplary"damages as a means of deterringsuch conduct.
The court awarded 1,000 pounds to Wilkes, which Massey
(1995) equatesto $1.5 million in 1995.
Huckle v. Money (1763) arose from the same series of
events. A journeyman printer employed by Wilkes was
arrestedand confined underthe same improperwarrant.He
received damages of 300 pounds (nearly 300 times his
weekly earnings)in his action for trespassand false imprisonment. In response to the defendant's vigorous protest
about the size of the award even though no actual injury
occurred,the court declared(Huckle v. Money 1763):
damI thinkthey[thejury]havedonerightin givingexemplary
in
ages.To entera man'shouseby virtueof a namelesswarrant,
orderto procure
a
evidence,is worsethantheSpanishInquisition;
lawunderwhichnoEnglishman
wouldwishto liveanhour;it was
a mostdaringpublicattackmadeuponthelibertyof thesubject.
Other cases from the same era provided large awards to
plaintiffs who had suffered little actual harm (Note 1957)
from instancesof slander(Hawkinsv. Sciet 1622), malicious
prosecution (Leith v. Pope 1780), criminal conversion
(Duberley v. Gunning 1792), seduction (Tullidge v. Wade
1769), and battery(Benson v. Frederick 1766).
By the early nineteenth century, English common law
allowed a jury to award far greater than the actual money
damages to deter improper conduct. Therefore, a court
upheld a jury verdictof 500 pounds for trespass.The defendanthadbeen "treadinguponplaintiff s grassandhuntingfor
game,"thoughno actualharmoccurred.The court observed
that"in a case where a man disregardsevery principlewhich
actuates the conduct of gentlemen, what is to restrainhim
except large damages?"(Merestv. Harvey 1814).

American Origins
The development of the punitive damages doctrine in the
United States followed the English experience.By 1791, an
Americancourt instructedthe jury prior to its deliberations
"notto estimatethe damagesby any particularproof of suffering,or actualloss, but to give damagesfor example'ssake,
to prevent such offenses in the future [emphasis added]"
(Coreyellv. Colbaugh1791;see, also, Genayv. Norris 1784).
By 1851, the U.S. Supreme Court observed that exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages were a well-established common law principlein tort cases that would allow
the plaintiff to recover more than compensatorydamages
alone (Day v. Woodworth1851). In 1886, that court reaffirmedthe principlethattortdamagescould include not only
compensationfor direct losses, but also a sum that serves as
a "remedyfor the greaterwrong and injury involved in the
apprehensionof its repetition"(Barry v. Edmunds1886).
In addition to these primaryobjectives of punitive damage awards, courts occasionally have cited other purposes
for them. Such damages sometimes are used to dampen a

plaintiff's desire to seek revenge, as in Alcorn v. Mitchell
(1872), in which the defendantpublicly spit in the plaintiff s
face. The court noted that, notwithstanding the minimal
degree of actualharm,the act was "one of the greatestindignity, highly provocative of retaliation by force." Liberal
damages in such circumstanceswould preserve"publictranquillity ... [by] ... saving the necessity of resort to personal
violence" (Alcorn v. Mitchell 1872).
Other courts have noted that punitive damage awards
encouragepersonsto serve as privateattorneysgeneral,protecting society's interestin discouragingserious misconduct
by making an example of wrongdoers. The opportunityto
obtain such a rewardoffers an incentive to privatepartiesto
pursuethe offenders,"especially when the prospectivecompensatoryrecovery is low or the expected cost of litigation
is high" (Tuttlev. Raymond 1985).
One commentatorexpanded on this view to characterize
punitivedamagesas a "populistweapon"thathistoricallyhas
served to redressthe imbalanceof power between monarch
and subject, railroadand passenger,or corporationand consumer. He points to consumer fraud and product liability
cases as examplesof wrongs that otherwisemight go unpunished, because the recovery of actual damages alone often
would not offset litigationexpenses (Massey 1995, p. 18).
A closely relatedpurposeis to avoid the situationin which
compensatorydamages alone might serve as a "license"for
a defendantto engage in deliberatelyharmfulacts. In Funkv.
Kerbaugh (1908) the defendant used unreasonablyheavy
explosive chargesduringrailroadconstruction,knowingthey
would cause harmto the plaintiffs house and barn.Despite
the plaintiffs requestthathe use lightercharges so as not to
continue the harm, the defendantpersisted, knowing that it
would be cheaper to pay compensatory damages than to
delay construction.A punitive damage awardpreventedthe
defendantfrom benefitingby his deliberatelywrongfulact.

Contemporary Role of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages serve two primarypurposesin contemporarysociety: to punish wrongdoersand deter similarbehavior in the future.The punishmentfunctionis obvious in that
the defendantis requiredto pay moneys beyond what is necessary to compensate the victim for the damages he or she
suffered.The punitive awardmust be large enough to cause
financial pain to the defendant;hence, the awardis likely to
vary depending on the wealth of the defendant.The deterrence function comes about because of the example set by
the punitive award. This defendant, as well as others who
might be considering the same behavior, are presumably
deterredby the knowledge that they too will be punished
severely if they behave like the defendant. Most jurisdictions mention both rationales when imposing punitive
awards(Dragutsky 1994, p. 919).
Punitive damages originated in response to intentional
misconduct: behavior known in advance to be wrong and
harmful.With the use of punitive damages in productliability litigation, the standardhas changed to include gross negligence and maliciousness. Therefore, the intent-to-harm
componentis no longer required.In addition,punitive damages are now awarded in mass tort litigation; hence; one
defendantcan be liable for punitivedamagesmany times for
the same offense. Punitive damages even are awardedocca-
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sionally in contractcases (Schwartz and Behrens 1993, p.
1369).
American tort law in most states embraces the idea that
punitive damages can be used in a civil suit to punish
wrongdoersand deter them and others from repeatingsuch
actions. Therefore,the Restatement(Second) of Torts(1979,
s908(1)) provides that punitivedamages are
ornominaldamages,awarded
damages,otherthancompensatory
conductandto
againsta personto punishhimforhis outrageous
deterhimandotherslikehimfromsimilarconductin thefuture.
Owen (1976, p. 1329; see also Rustadand Koenig 1993,
p. 1311) categorizedbehaviorsdeserving punitive damages
20 years ago in a list that is still widely cited:
1. Fraudulent-type
misconduct-wherethedefendantmisrepresentsresearchdataor suppliesfalse or incompleteinformationto consumers.
2. Knowingviolationof safetystandards-wherethedefendant
choosesto ignoreknownregulations
relatedto theproduct.
3. Inadequate
testingandmanufacturing
procedures-wherethe
defendant'stestingandqualitycontrolareinadequate
to the
extentthatconsumersareexposedto unreasonable
risks.
4. Failuresto warnof knowndangersbeforemarketing-where
the sellerknowsof a dangerpriorto sale,butdoes notwarn
or otherwiseconveythisinformation
to consumers.
5. Post-marketing
failuresto remedyknowndangers-where
the seller learnsaboutdangersthatwereunknownpriorto
sale butdoes not warnor otherwiseconveythis information
to consumers.
Commentatorshave noted that though punitive damages
still are awarded occasionally for manufacturingdefects,
most contemporary cases are based on product design
defects or failure to warn (Butler 1996, p. 2170; Rustadand
Koenig 1993, p. 1312). Therefore,marketing'srole in punitive damages litigation continues to be critical and must be
scrutinizedcarefully by firms.

Scope of PunitiveDamagesin Product
Liability Litigation
The use of punitive damagesin productliability litigationin
the United States dates back approximately30 years to two
drug productcases involving falsified dataand misrepresentations about product safety (Roginskyv. Richardson-Merrell 1967; Toole v. Richardson-Merrell1967). The introduction of punitive damages into the productliability arena
followed closely the arrivalof strict liability as a theory of
recovery in Greenmanv. YubaPower Products (1963).
Rustad(1992, p. 10) notes thatpunitivedamages in product liability came under attack shortly after the Greenman
decision. The Defense Research Institute distributed a
monograph urging that punitive damages should be abolished (Duffy 1969). The FederalInteragencyTask Force on
Product Liability drafted a model product liability law in
1979 (Rustad 1992, p. 11). Some sort of productliability act
has been reintroducedinto Congress every year since 1982,
but no determinativeaction has been taken.
Rhetoric about the punitive damages situation abounds;
however, much of the data quoted in the popularpress are
withoutfoundationor are tradedback and forth among publications. Galanter(1992) asserts that some of the cited sta-
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tistics are contrived.He statesthatthe $300 billion allegedly
spent on tort litigation is speculation by people trying to
support predeterminedpositions (Galanter 1992, p. 28).
Most of the growthin productliability litigationreportedby
the General Accounting Office (GAO) can be attributedto
mass tort litigation (e.g., asbestos, Benedectin, Dalkon
Shield cases), admittedlya tort problemarea (GAO 1989)
Groups, particularlydefense attorneysand trade associations, have urgedthatthe UnitedStatesreformits tortsystem
because of, among other reasons, the growing number of
punitive damages settlements. Experts claim that product
developmentis inhibitedbecause of the specter of punitive
damages when innovativeproductsturnout to have unforeseen side effects (Drug Topics 1996). PresidentClinton,like
his predecessors,has found himself under scrutiny for his
views on productliability,particularlygiven his recentveto of
a federalbill thatwouldhavelimitedpunitivedamages(Home
Office Computing1996; Johnson1996;Wharton1996).
As the data in Table 1 indicate,punitive damages claims
grew in popularitythroughoutthe 1960s, 1970s, and early
1980s. Although the past ten years have witnessed numerous calls for punitivedamagesreform(see, e.g., Allen 1987;
Boutrous 1996; Business Week 1989; Duncan 1995), the
numberof punitive damagesclaims has remainedrelatively
steady.
Empirical studies of punitive damages also suggest that
the problem is not as serious as some commentatorsimply
(Gordon 1992). Saks (1992, p. 1254), in a review of the literatureon punitive damages, concludes that "every empirical study of the [punitive damages] question has reached
conclusions that,to say the least, fail to supportthese beliefs
[that the problem is serious]."Rustad (1992) came to this
conclusion afterreviewing the same and other studies.
The Rand Institutefor Civil Justicestudiedtwo locations,
Chicago and San Francisco,between 1960 and 1984. This
studyconcludedthat"punitivedamages... in personalinjury
cases has changedvery little in 25 years"(Peterson 1987, p.
122; see also Peterson, Sarma, and Shanley 1987). The
American Bar Foundationsponsoreda study of more than
25,000 jury verdictsthat were drawnfrom acrossthe United
States. Researchersencountered967 product liability verdicts, 34 of which awardedpunitive damages (Daniels and
Martin 1988). They concluded that the awards were "quite
proportionateto the actualdamages"(Rustad 1992, p. 27).
The GAO (1989) studiedtwo years' worthof trialsin five
states and also interviewed attorneys after the trials were
completed. The GAO opined that punitive awards "were
neitherroutinenor excessively large"(Rustad 1992, p. 28).
The GAO also found that punitive awards were reduced
substantiallyin settlementconferencesand because of posttrial appeals. Landesand Posner(1986) examinedtwo years
of reported product liability cases at the trial and federal
appellatecourtlevels and found that punitivedamages were
granted in 10 of 172 cases. The punitive awards survived
intact in 1 case, were reducedin 3 others, and were reversed
and remandedin the remaining6 cases (Landes and Posner
1986, p. 35).
In the context of the controversy surroundingpunitive
damages, the U.S. SupremeCourt has dealt with this topic
several times in the past decade. We now review the five
significant punitive damages decisions rendered by the
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Table 1.

Legal Developments (Edited by Ross D. Petty)
PunitiveDamagesin ProductLiabilityCases

Year

Federal

Search1
State

1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971

101
95
87
96
100
93
67
86
70
65
90
68
56
41
39
29
15
13
10
9
10
10
6
6
0
0

79
72
70
88
78
74
64
71
61
60
61
65
71
47
48
28
25
28
16
14
16
14
8
6
3
3

180
167
157
184
178
167
131
157
131
125
151
133
127
88
87
57
40
41
26
23
26
24
14
12
3
3

112
100
79
102
99
97
93
79
85
66
93
81
62
55
43
25
24
15
10
6
12
13
9
5
0
1

81
82
69
95
89
87
64
71
57
57
59
68
58
48
36
29
23
20
9
16
8
7
7
2
3
4

193
182
148
197
188
184
157
150
142
123
152
149
120
103
79
54
47
35
19
22
20
20
16
7
3
5

1970

2

3

5

2

2

4

1969
1968
1967
1966

1
1
1
1

1
2
2
1

2
3
3
1

2
1
1
0

3
2
1
1

5
3
2
1

Total

Federal

Search2
State

Total

Dataarederivedfroma 1/2/97searchof theLexis(1997)databaseof reported
cases.TheSearch1 phraseis "punitive
damage(s)(within255 wordsof) product liabilityor strictliability"foreachyear.TheSearch2 phraseis "product
foreach
liabilityand(punitiveor exemplary)(within2 wordsof) damage(s)"
year.Thesedatasomewhatoverstatetheincidenceof punitiveawardsin recentyearsbecausenoteverycaseincludingthesearchphrasesinvolvesa punitive
award.Insomecasesthecourtcouldbe discussinga priorverdictwhosecentralfeaturewasa disputeoverpunitivedamages.In anyevent,thepercentage
of
casesdiscussingpunitivedamagesis quitesmall.Forexample,in 1995punitivedamageswerementionedin 2253 outof morethan70,000reported
federal
cases.Of the2253,only 168involvedproductliabilityor strictliability.

SupremeCourt since this topic was last examined in detail
in the marketingliterature(see Morgan 1989). Table 2 contains a summary of the punitive damages issues in these
cases.

Recent SupremeCourt Decisions
InvolvingPunitiveDamages
We providegreaterdetail in our discussion of the BMWcase
because the othershave been analyzedin considerabledetail
in the legal and business periodicalliterature.

Industriesv. KelcoDisposal(1989)
Browning-Ferris
Browning-FerrisIndustries (BFI) supplied roll-off waste
collection services in Burlington, Vt., and surrounding
areas. A former BFI employee started Kelco Disposal in
1980 to compete with BFI. BFI offered to buy Kelco in 1982
in response to its capturing 43% of the market. Kelco
declined, and BFI dropped its prices to drive Kelco out of
business. BFI did not respond to Kelco's legal threatsand

continued its reduced price policy. In spite of these tactics,
Kelco gained 56% of the marketby 1985, which resultedin
BFI selling out to anotherfirm.
Kelco sued BFI in 1984 in federal district court in Vermont, alleging that BFI violated the ShermanAct by trying
to monopolize the marketand that BFI had interferedintentionally with Kelco's contractualrelations, a state law tort
claim. In a jury trial, Kelco prevailed on both claims. At a
second trial for damages, the jury awarded$51,146 in compensatorydamages and $6 million in punitive damages.The
court "awarded Kelco $153,438 in treble damages and
$212,500 in attorney'sfees and costs on the federalantitrust
claim, or, in the alternative,$6,066,082.74 in compensatory
and punitive damages on the state-law claim" (BrowningFerris Industriesv. Kelco Disposal 1989, p. 2913). This outcome was affirmedby the Second CircuitCourtof Appeals.
The key appealsissue for the SupremeCourtwas the constitutionality of the punitive award under the Excessive
Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment (see, e.g., Liv-
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PolicyIssuesRaisedin RecentSupremeCourtPunitiveDamagesCases
PolicyIssues

Case
Industries
Browning-Ferris
v. KelcoDisposal(1989)

ExcessiveFines Clauseof the EighthAmendmentdoes not limit punitivedamagesin civil cases
hasa rolein thelitigation,eitheras a party
betweenprivateparties.Maybe differentif thegovernment
or a beneficiary.

PacificMutualLifeInsurance
v. Haslip(1991)

Amendment
were
Due ProcessClauseof the Fourteenth
appliesto privatelitigants.The procedures
in
this
in
a
4:1
to
ratio.
instance,
resulting
punitive compensatory
acceptable

TXOProductsv.
AllianceResources(1993)

werenotunfair.
DueProcessClauseagainapplies.Outcomewasnotgrosslyexcessive,andprocedures
ratiois allowedto stand.
A 526:1punitiveto compensatory

HondaMotorv. Oberg(1994)

of post-trial
DueProcessClauseagainapplies.Oregon'sprohibition
judicialreviewof punitiveawards
OtherOregonprocedures
allowedto standwithoutcomment.
is unconstitutional.

BMWv. Gore(1996)

Theplaintiffsufferedonlynoneconomic
DueProcessClauseprohibitsa grosslyexcessivepunishment.
damages,andthedefendant'sconductwasnotsufficientlyegregioustojustifythepunitiveamount.

ingston 1990; Sneiderman 1990; Yarab 1990). The Court
determinedthatneitherthe EighthAmendmentnor common
law providedany justificationfor overturningthe trial court
results. The Court decided that the Excessive Fines Clause
was not applicable when the litigants were private parties
(not governmententities). The original intent of this clause
was to limit the possible abuse of governmentalprosecutorial power. The Courtthus upheldthe jury's decision.

Pacific MutualLife Insurancev. Haslip (1991)
An insurance agent, selling Pacific Mutual's and other
firms' products,proposeda grouphealthinsuranceprogram
to cover employees of an Alabamacity employing Haslip.
The agent sent the initial premiumsto the insurers,but kept
all additional premiums. The companies sent notice of
cancellation to the city throughthe agent, who did not forward them. When Haslip was hospitalizedand attemptedto
use her insurance,she learnedthe circumstancessurrounding her lack of coverage. She sued the agent and the insuring company, Pacific Mutual.The jury found for the plaintiff, awardingher $200,000 in compensatorydamages and
$840,000 in punitive damages. The SupremeCourtof Alabama reviewed this decision and specifically upheld the
punitive damages amount.The U.S. SupremeCourtagreed.
The essence of Pacific Mutual's appeal was the Due
Process Clause of the FourteenthAmendment (see, e.g.,
Breslo 1992; Richards 1992). The Courtruled that the jury
had been fair in its deliberationsthatresultedin the punitive
award and that juries long had been given the latitude to
awardpunitive damages undercommon law. Therefore,the
defendant'srights had not been violated underthe Constitution. Among other interpretations,the Haslip decision suggested that the Court had implied a limit on the punitive to
compensatoryratio of approximately4:1.

TXO Productsv. AllianceResources(1993)
TXO contractedwith Alliance for the oil and gas development rights on a parcel of land leased by Alliance from
another company. After learning that another party, Signairo, had a potential claim on these rights, TXO tried to
contract with Signairo without informing Alliance. TXO

then engaged in several tactics to break the contract with
Alliance, includingbringinga frivolous legal action to try to
reducethe agreed-uponroyaltypayments.The jury awarded
Alliance $19,000 in compensatory damages, its costs of
defending the lawsuit, and $10 million in punitive damages
based on TXO's bad faith, size, and connections with a
larger firm. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
upheld the trial court's determination.
TXO appealedthisdecision,arguingthatthepunitiveaward
violated the Due Process Clause of the FourteenthAmendment on two levels: the sum being grossly excessive (526
times the compensatoryamount)and based on an unfairprocedure.The SupremeCourtaffirmedthe award,rejectingboth
of TXO's assertions.The Courtdid not offer its own criteria
andonce againnotedthatthe outcomeof a fairandreasonable
processwas entitledto a strongpresumptionof validity.
In TXOthe Courtessentially passed on an opportunityto
develop clear and convincing guidelines for assessing
whether punitive damages were assessed according to
acceptableprocedures(see, e.g., Sperow 1994; Stuart1994).
The Court implicitly found that the proceduraldue process
from Haslip-that is, properjury instructions,adequatetrial
court review, and adequateappellatecourt review-should
govern states' systems of determining punitive damages.
The Court also indicated that the Haslip procedures were
not minimumacceptablelevels because the Court approved
less restrictivedue process proceduresin TXO.The punitive
to compensatoryratio of 526:1 convincingly surpassedthe
4:1 Haslip ratio.

HondaMotor v. Oberg(1994)
Herethe plaintiffwas ridinga three-wheeledall-terrain(ATV)
vehicle producedandsold by the defendant.While drivingup
a steephill, the plaintiffwas severelyandpermanentlyinjured
when the ATV overturnedonto him. Obergsued Honda,arguing thatit shouldhave knownthatthe ATV was unreasonably
and inherentlydangerous.Thejury foundfor the plaintiffand
awardedhim $5 million in punitivedamagesand $939,390 in
compensatorydamages,the latterreduced20%becauseof the
plaintiff'scontributorynegligence.
Honda appealed, arguing that its rights under the Due
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Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment had been
violated and that the punitive award was excessive. An
Oregon appellate court rejected these appeals, stating that
the jury exercised reasonable power within the bounds of
Oregonlaw. The OregonSupremeCourtaffirmedthis decision, agreeingthatthejury conformedreasonablywith Oregon law.
The Supreme Court agreed with Honda in part, thus
reversing and remandingthe case (see, e.g., Alliker 1995;
Macario 1995; Toney 1994). The key issue was an amendment to the Oregon Constitution that prohibits post-trial
judicial review and correctionof excessive punitive awards.
The Courtfound thatthis denial of review violated the Fourteenth Amendment.The Court did not go on to comment
about or ratify the other elements of Oregon's review. The
Oregon SupremeCourtsubsequentlyreviewed the decision
and affirmedthe appellateand trialcourts' decisions (Oberg
v. Honda Motor 1996), reinstatingthe $5 million punitive
awardas well as the compensatoryamount.

BMW v. Gore (1996)
Ira Gore bought a black BMW sedan in January1990 from
an authorizedBMW dealer in Birmingham,Ala. He drove
the car for about nine months before taking it to a car
detailer in order to improve its appearance. Slick, the
detailer, noticed signs that the car had been repaintedand
mentionedthis to Gore. Partsof the vehicle---quarterpanels,
top, hood, and trunk-had been repaintedat BMW's facility
in Georgia. Hearingthis, Gore believed he had been cheated
and sued BMW of North America, the Americandistributor
of BMW automobiles, the German manufacturer,and the
local dealership. Gore claimed that BMW's failure to tell
him that the car had been repaintedconstitutedfraud-that
is, suppressionof a materialfact.
BMW had implementeda nationwide policy in 1983 of
repairing vehicles damaged during manufactureor transport. If the cost of repair was 3% or less of the car's suggested retail price, BMW sold the cars as new without
informing its dealers. If repaircosts exceeded 3%, the cars
were placed in company service for a while and then sold as
used. The cost to repairGore's care was $601.37, approximately 1.5%of its $40,000+ retailprice. BMW assertedthat
the repairedcar was as good as a new one. BMW believed a
punitive award was improper because of its good-faith
belief that it had no duty to disclose this minor repair to
Gore.
Gore claimed that having the car repaintedlessened its
value by approximately10%;hence, he asked for compensatory damages of $4,000. He also included evidence that
BMW had sold 983 refinishedcars since 1983 without disclosing that they had been repainted. On the basis of the
damageestimateof $4,000 per vehicle, Gore asked for punitive damages of $4 million, the approximatevalue of the
total excess price charged by BMW. The jury in the
Alabama state court returneda verdict favoring Gore over
BMW of North America in the amount of $4,000 in compensatorydamages and $4 million in punitivedamages.
BMW filed several post-trialmotions, including a claim
thatits nondisclosurepolicy was acceptablein more than20
states. Some states mandateddisclosure of repairsexceeding 3% of the suggested retail price, but none requireddis-

closure of lesser repairs(BMW v. Gore 1996). BMW also
noted that its nondisclosurepolicy had not been challenged
before this lawsuit was filed, thus makingpunitive damages
an overly severe penalty. Before this judgment was delivered, BMW changed its policy to avoid sales of refinished
cars in Alabama and two other states. After the verdict,
BMW instituteda nationwidepolicy of full disclosure of all
repairs.
The trial court denied all of BMW's motions. The
Alabama Supreme Court ruled that the punitive award was
not excessive in terms of constitutionallypermittedlimits.
This courtsdid determinethatthe trialcourtwas incorrectin
calculating punitive damages on the basis of the numberof
refinished autos sold in jurisdictions other than Alabama.
The punitive award was reduced to $2 million, though the
court did not present any reasoning for choosing this
amount.
The U.S. Supreme Court, using traditionalreasoning for
invoking punitive damages, declared the $2 million to be
grossly excessive in terms of the state's interest in punishment and deterrence.The Courtmentionedthree guidelines
for assessing damages (BMWv. Gore 1996):
1. thedegreeof reprehensibility,
2. the ratioof the punitivedamageawardto the actualharm
inflictedon theplaintiff,and
3. the state'ssanctionsfor comparable
misconduct.
This case seemed to have been decided on the first guideline. Gore suffered only minor economic damages because
he purchased an automobile that had been refinished. He
was not seriously injuredor physically harmedin any way.
Although this case marks the first time in decades that a
punitiveawardhas been overturned,the decision did little to
guide legislatures crafting statutes to clarify punitive damages guidelines (Pappas 1996).

Public Policy Issues Emergingfrom
SupremeCourt Decisions
Computing the Punitive Award
The basic public policy question is whether punitive damages should be limited in some sense: an absolute amount,
in relationshipto compensatorydamages,or as a percentage
of the defendant's financial situation. A related question is
whether punitive damages would continue to function as a
punishmentand deterrentif some limitationis approved.
An absolute dollar limit makes punitive damages predictable for purposes of decision making. A company pondering an unlawful act, for example, concealing known
product dangers through failure to warn, will be able to
quantify the possible punitive damages exposure. If the
profits from the proposedconcealmentare large enough, the
anticipatedpunitivepenalty will not deterthe behavior.This
outcome defeats the fundamental deterrence purpose of
punitive damages (see Partlett 1996).
Tying punitive damages to compensatorydamages also
diminishes the effectiveness of punitivedamages. Proposals
of this type have surfacedseveral times in recent years, typically calling for punitive to compensatoryratios of 2:1 or
3:1 (see, e.g., Diveley 1995). This ratio reasoning emerged
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from the Pacific Mutual Life Insurance v. Haslip (1991, p.
23) decision when the Court noted that the nearly 4:1 ratio
was "close to the line." Comparisons like this divert the
attention from the defendant's behavior to the plaintiff's
injury, essentially "skirting the policies of punitive damages" (Toney 1994, p. 681). Ratios are ineffective when the
plaintiff managed to avoid being harmed in spite of the
intentional conduct of the defendant or if the plaintiff's
injuries are economic only (see, e.g., TXO Products v.
Alliance Resources 1993).
Several states alreadyhave developed limits for punitive
awards. Diveley (1995, p. 31) notes that more than a dozen
states have enacted legislation to curb punitive damages.
The typical statute specifies an absolute limit, usually
$250,000 or two or three times the compensatoryamount,
whicheveris less. Alabama,which has a notorioushistoryof
punitive awards,has the following:
s6-11-21. Punitivedamagesnotto exceed$250,000;an award
of punitivedamagesshall not exceed $250,000,unless it is
baseduponone or moreof thefollowing:
1. A patternor practiceof intentionalwrongfulconduct,even
thoughthe damageor injurywas inflictedonlyon the plaintiff;or,
2. Conductinvolvingactualmaliceotherthanfraudorbadfaith
not a partof a patternor practice;or,
3. Libel,slander,or defamation(Codeof Alabamas6-11-21;
cf. FloridaStatutes,Ch.768.73).
Calculating punitive damages on the basis of the defendant's wealth would allow defendantsto anticipatepunitive
awards. Even so, the prospect of a substantial punitive
penalty would still act as a deterrent.Allowing the defendant's wealth into the formula for punitive damages is a
controversialstep (Abrahamand Jeffries 1989). The plaintiff's bar generally supportsthis view, whereas the defense
baropposes it. Commentatorshave suggesteda compromise
in that wealth would not be used to establish the punitive
awardbut insteadwould be used to judge whetherthe award
was excessive after it was set (see, e.g., Kirgis 1993;
Schwartz and Behrens 1993). This suggestion seems to
overlook both punishment and deterrence goals. Without
knowing whether the punitive awardactually was going to
harmthe defendantfinancially,the jury would not know the
appropriatelevel of punishment.If punitive damages are to
be limited in some manner, we supporta percentagelimit,
ratherthan an absolute limit, on the defendant'swealth.

ConstitutionalIssues
Two majorconstitutionalquestions have been raised by the
cases discussed herein: the Excessive Fines Clause of the
EighthAmendmentand the Due Process Clauseof the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment also can be
invoked in those cases in which a defendantfinds itself paying punitivedamagesmore thanonce for a common offense,
such as a mass tort (Macchiarola 1996; McKown 1995, p.
459). The initial paragraphof Browning-FerrisIndustriesv.
Kelco Disposal (1989, p. 263) deals with the Excessive
Fines Clause:
This Courthas neverheld, or even intimated,thatthe Eighth
Amendment
servesas a checkon the powerof a juryto award
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damagesin a civil case. Rather,our concernsin applyingthe
EighthAmendmenthavebeenwithcriminalprocessandwith
directactionsinitiatedby governmentto inflict punishment.
Awardsof punitivedamagesdo not implicatetheseconcerns.
Wethereforehold,on thebasisof thehistoryandpurposeof the
EighthAmendment,thatits ExcessiveFines Clausedoes not
applyto awardsof punitivedamagesin cases betweenprivate
parties.
The meaning of this citation is clear; however, recent
statutory developments are again raising Eighth Amendment issues. Several states are now partiesto punitivedamages awards(Hurdand Zollers 1994; Stevens 1994). Thatis,
plaintiffs must now share some portionof punitivedamages
awards in several states. For example, the following wording comes from a 1996 Georgia statute:
(e)(2) Seventy-fivepercentof anyamountsawardedunderthis
subsectionas punitivedamages,less a proportionate
partof the
costs of litigation,includingreasonableattorney'sfees, all as
determined
by the trialjudge,shallbe paidintothe treasuryof
the state... the stateshallhaveall rightsdue a judgmentcreditoruntilsuchjudgmentis satisfiedandshallstandon equalfooting withthe plaintiffof theoriginalcase in securinga recovery
afterpaymentto theplaintiffof damagesawardedotherthanas
punitive damages (Official Code of Georgia Annotated,
s51-12-5.1).
Such laws have come into being partiallyin response to
the criticism that punitive awards representan undeserved
windfall to plaintiffsand actuallycould encouragelitigation
(see, e.g., Schwartz 1988). To better serve the punishment
and deterrence goals, society at large should share in the
punitive award rather than just the plaintiff who already
recovers throughcompensatorydamages. Such statutesalso
raise certain difficulties, such as when litigants reach a settlement exceeding the compensatoryrequest, but less than
the sum of the compensatoryplus punitive request.How is
the settlement apportionedamong attorney fees, compensatory damages, and punitive damages?
The Due Process Clause was addressedin Pacific Mutual
v. Haslip (1991, p. 18):
We neednot,andindeedwe cannot,drawa mathematical
bright
line betweenthe constitutionally
acceptableand the constituthat wouldfit every case. We can say,
tionallyunacceptable
andadequate
however,thatgeneralconcernsof reasonableness
guidancefromthecourtwhenthecaseis triedto a juryproperly
enterintotheconstitutional
calculus.
The Courthas not articulatedwhat amountsto properdue
process; however, the Court did note that Alabama had
developed seven useful criteriato assess the adequacyof a
punitive award(Haslip 1991, pp. 21-22):
1. Whetherthereis a reasonable
betweenthepunirelationship
tive damagesawardand the harmlikely to resultfromthe
defendant'sconductas well as the harmthat actuallyhas
occurred;
2. Thedegreeof reprehensibility
of thedefendant's
conduct,the
durationof thatconduct,thedefendant'sawareness,anyconcealment,and the existenceand frequencyof similarpast
conduct;
3. Theprofitability
to thedefendant
of thewrongfulconductand
the desirabilityof removingthat profitand of havingthe
defendantalso sustaina loss;

This content downloaded from 138.202.1.110 on Fri, 23 Jan 2015 16:09:41 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

170

Legal Developments(Editedby Ross D. Petty)

4. The"financial
position"of thedefendant;
5. All thecostsof litigation;
6. Theimpositionof criminalsanctionson thedefendantfor its
and
conduct,theseto be takenin mitigation;
7. Theexistenceof othercivil awardsagainstthe defendantfor
the sameconduct,thesealsoto be takenin mitigation.
If we add to this list a mandatorypost-trialreview of the
punitive award by the trial court and a set of jury instructions that explains the role of punitive damages, we have a
workablelist of due processguarantees.The appealsprocess
provides for anotherlevel of review.

OtherProceduralIssues
Proceduralprecautionis the key to preservingpunitivedamages as a viable punishmentand deterrent.The punishment
aspect of punitivedamages is a criminalconcept, and criminal law employs substantialprotection of the defendant's
due process rights (Forward 1993, p. 1250). Legal experts
have suggested two additionalareas for improving or safeguardingthe punitive damages process: raising the level of
proof requiredfor awardingpunitive damages and separating the determinationof compensatorydamages from the
assessment of punitive damages.
The Haslip (1991, p. 23, note 11) Courtnoted the strength
of a higher standardof proof:
We haveconsideredthearguments
raisedby PacificMutualand
someof its amicias to theconstitutional
necessityof imposing
a standardof proofof punitivedamageshigherthan"preponderanceof theevidence."Thereis muchto be saidin favorof a
State'srequiring... a standardof "clearand convincingevidence"or,even,"beyonda reasonable
doubt,"as in thecriminal
context.
In the lexicon of courts, "clear and convincing" falls
between "preponderanceof the evidence" and "beyond a
reasonabledoubt,"the latterbeing the criminal standardof
proof. Nearly half of the states have gone on to develop
statutory language embracing the "clear and convincing"
standard.The 1996 Georgia statute, discussed previously,
states:
(b) Punitivedamagesmaybe awardedonly in suchtortactions
in whichit is provenby clearandconvincingevidencethatthe
defendant'sactionsshowedwillfulmisconduct,malice,fraud,
orthatentirewantof carewhichwould
wantonness,
oppression,
raisethepresumption
to consequences
of consciousindifference
(OfficialCodeof GeorgiaAnnotated,s51-12-5.1).
Concern for standardof proof has led to recommendations that trials involving punitive damages requests be
bifurcated.The first part of the trial would be the determination of the defendant's culpability and the appropriate
compensatoryaward.The second part would deal with the
punitive damages question and its related higher level of
proof. Expertscontendthatthis approachwould preventevidence related to the punitive award from biasing the jury's
overall assessment of guilt and compensatory damages
(Comment 1996; Schwartzand Behrens 1996).

MarketingImplications
The guideline, "Do not intentionallyharmconsumers,"captures the essence of proper marketingbehavior; however,

this standardprovides nothing in the way of managerial
action implications. Timely communicationof information
is the key to avoiding situations in which consumers have
been injuredby faulty productsin a mannermeriting punitive damages. During the product development process, a
product's dangerous propensities should be cataloged and
regularlybroughtto the attentionof managers.Knowledge
of these hazardouspropertiesarises during in-house design
sessions, throughmarketingtesting of prototypes,and eventually from customer feedback about usage situations.
Salespeople are anothervaluable source of safety information because of their regularcontact with customers.
A company has two choices in terms of dealing with
unsafe features or perilous in-use situations. It can design
away the problemsor provide warningsto consumersabout
the potential dangers. Design solutions are clearly superior
to warnings because the former eliminate the danger,
whereas warnings rely on consumers to read, process, and
heed warnings.The use of warnings shifts safety responsibility from marketersto consumers who could ignore (distractedor busy users) or misunderstand(complex language,
illiteracy, or language barriers)warnings. We believe that
permittingsuch shifting of responsibilityto consumers constitutes unacceptable public policy. Warnings should be
used only if dangers cannot be designed out of productsor
if the dangers are an inherentpart of useful products (e.g.,
hammers,power tools).
Given known dangers, marketersmust convey this information to consumers, especially information in the company's possession priorto marketingthe product.Conscious
failure to warn of known dangers is tantamountto inviting
punitive damages claims. The entire communications program should focus on transmittingthe seriousnessof known
dangers. Print and broadcastadvertisementsshould include
disclosures about the dangers, though such disclosures can
reduce the impact of advertisements.In addition,ad content
should not encourage or imply unsafe productuse, particularly use that stretches a productto the limits of its design.
Likewise, salespeople should not mitigate the impact of
warnings by their statements to prospects and customers
during sales calls. Salesperson statementsthat are wrong or
intentionally misleading readily could lead to a punitive
damages award.
The final step in eliminatingpunitive awardsis to have a
recall program in place so that it can be implemented
quickly if necessary. Recall programs,by necessity, immediately remove dangerousproductsfrom consumers' hands.
When the company hears about productusers being hurtby
a productand then decides to recall the item, it is too late to
develop the recall program.An effective, plannedrecall programis also a signal thata company is concernedabout consumer safety, a good position to be in if punitive damages
litigation arises.

Conclusion
Although the constitutional arguments have not been
debated fully by the Supreme Court, the Court at least has
indicatedthat it is going to examine proceduraldue process
in cases involving disputes about punitive damages. Therefore, over time, the Court's position on due process will
evolve, albeit perhaps slowly. States therefore should
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concentrate on developing concrete laws governing jury
instructions about assessing punitive damages, trial court
review of jury decisions, appellate review of trial court
results, and State Supreme Courts' reviews of appellate
adjudication.Developing specific guidelines is well beyond
the scope of this analysis; however, the Court clearly has
indicatedthat such proceduresare necessary.
Legislative action is preferredover intermittentSupreme
Courtdecisions.Courts,by the natureof theirfunction,see the
specific facts of a case and any precedentbroughtinto the
courtroom. Moreover, courts at different levels or circuits
could disagree on how to apply SupremeCourtdecisions to
cases involving similarfact situations.Analysis of recentpost
BMWcases suggests thatfederalcourtsmorethanstatecourts
are cuttingpunitivedamageawards(MacLachlan1997). Legislatures have access to much more information,such as
expertson all sides of an issue,reviewsof all relevantlitigation
bothwithinandoutsidethe state,anda sense of thepreferences
of the citizens. All of this providesa usefulbackdropfor punitive damagesreformthataccommodatesdivergentviews.
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